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ife with God?
That phrase is almost redundant.
There’s no such thing as life without God. Existence, protein
transfer, metabolic function, yes.
But life?
Nietzsche once said, God is
dead. If so, what does that mean
for those made in His image? It
means that there is no hope of
ever finding out how to live. And,
if we don’t know how to live, how
can we live?
Jean Paul Sartre, the century’s
most influential atheist, said that
“it is very distressing that God
does not exist, because all possibility of finding values in a
heaven of ideas disappears along
with Him; there can no longer be
an a priori Good, since there is
no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it.” Bertrand Russell
wrote that “many traditional
ethical concepts are difficult to
interpret except on the assumption that there is a God or a
World Spirit or at least an immanent cosmic Purpose.” Atheist
apologist J. L. Mackie argued
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that “moral properties constitute
so odd a cluster of properties and
relations that are most unlikely
to have risen in the ordinary
course of events without an allpowerful god to create them.”
In a life without God . . . the
Truth, or the Good (whatever
those terms now mean) do not
permeate the world as do the
Pythagorean theorem, the Laws
of Thermodynamics, or Planck’s
constant; morals are not like Special or General Relativity, fundamental facts of reality waiting
thousands of years for Albert
Einstein to extract them from the
air. Instead, in a life without
God, morality is as subjective and
personal as fingerprints; perhaps
it’s not even that real but mere
cultural and personal biases more
dependent upon one’s childhood
relationship to his or her mother
than upon any transcendent
norm. There is no “ought,” only
“is” and from this “is” no “ought”
can be absolutely derived. With
God dead, moral knowledge can’t
exist, only moral belief. Morality
is a preference, as for Beethoven’s

Third Symphony over David
Bowie’s The Rise and Fall of Ziggy
Stardust and the Spiders From
Mars, or for Big Macs over Clams
Casino. Values are judged by
their utility; “good” gets the
trains to run on time, “bad”
causes them to be late. Or even
less fundamental: “good” is what
you like, “bad” is what you don’t.
Human senses (not divine commandments), human appetites
(not sacred texts), and human
desires (not religious injunctions), these are the stuff that
morality—good, evil, right, and
wrong—are made of because
there is nothing else. Truth is
horizontal, not vertical; it’s physical, not spiritual; it comes from
mitosis, testosterone, and protein
metabolism, not from the Lord,
the Torah, the Ruach HaKodesh.
Values have to be contrived from
among ourselves, concocted out
of a boiling brew of human passion, flesh, and dreams, and not
revealed by some brooding omnipresence in the sky. As players
in a game, we make up the rules
as we go along; we must, because
the primates didn’t leave behind
detailed instructions.
Of course, Bertrand Russell,
Friedrich Nietzsche, John Paul
Sartre, and J. L. Mackie all knew
that it was wrong to torture little
children. Many atheists and secularists have been, still are, and
will be “good” people, at times
even “better” than their religious
counterparts (after all, when was
the last time a skeptic strapped
himself full of explosives and
took out a city bus?). That atheists and secularists can devise internally coherent moral systems
is not the issue; the issue, instead,
is what they can’t do—and that
is derive an internally coherent
moral system based upon any
transcendent or immutable absolute because—they assert (often
absolutely)—none exists.
A system is only as stable as its
foundation. Why build a house
on pink elephants when nothing

With God dead, moral knowledge can’t exist,
only moral belief
more than a purple turtle could
knock it down? We work only
with what’s available, and for the
secularist, the atheist, what’s
available is only conditional, relative, human, nothing more because there is nothing else.
If values are derived from humanity, from human needs, from
human nature, from human desires alone, because these needs,
natures, and desires are malleable,
fluctuating, and transient, all
morals systems based on them
must be as well. Maybe that’s
good; maybe values should
change along with desires and
needs; maybe morals should fluctuate with the Winter Solstice or

ment stick together with the sweat
of his intellectual and moral turmoil. Sofya Semyonovna
Marmeladov becomes a prostitute in order to feed her starving
little brother and sister. Rodion
Ramonovitch Raskolnikov kills a
nasty, spiteful old usurer and
steals her money in order to help
his mother and sister, to advance
his studies, and to become someone great who will devote himself to fulfilling his “humane obligations to mankind.”
Were these acts, given the intense circumstances that framed
them, wrong? Was Rodion
Ramonovitch right when he said
that “a single misdeed is permis-

If values are derived from humanity, from
human needs, from human nature, from
human desires alone, because these needs,
natures, and desires are malleable,
fluctuating, and transient, all morals
systems based on them must be as well.
the full moon; maybe there
should be no moral axioms, only
moral hypotheses, maybe there
should be no moral imperatives,
only moral hunches. Maybe truth
is more poetic than geometric,
more hormonal than metaphysical, more like wind than rocks.
If so, then, one must admit that,
given specific circumstances, torturing little children might be the
moral thing to do. Who can say
with terminal certainty that it’s
wrong when, working only with
the conditional and the relative,
you can never say anything but
the conditional and the relative?
Dostoevsky grappled with
these questions so fervently that
the pages of Crime and Punish-

sible if the principal aim is right,
a solitary wrongdoing and hundreds of good deeds!” If there be
no God who has imposed an immutable moral order on the universe, what grounds can one use
to, categorically, condemn murder and prostitution? What authority can, justly, impose these
moral restraints upon autonomous souls?
None.
That’s what life without God
would be like. That’s why, in the
end, it’s not really life.
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